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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

OLD WINE, OLD BOTTLES, AND NOT VERY NEW CORKS: ON
STATE RFRAS AND FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE

MARK STRASSER*
I. INTRODUCTION
State actors can engage in nullification in many ways. While a
paradigmatic example involves a public official interfering in some way in the
recognition or enforcement of individual rights arising under federal law, other
examples include a state legislature’s disapproving of a court’s interpretation
of federal law and then enacting more protective legislation. Several states
have passed state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) after the
United States Supreme Court offered a narrow interpretation of free exercise
guarantees in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith1 and struck down the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores.2
Smith was controversial and likely understated the protections afforded
under free exercise guarantees.3 Nonetheless, the Court had not been consistent
with respect to its recognition of the strength of free exercise guarantees in the
case law preceding Smith,4 and a (legislative) rejection of a particular decision
like Smith does not establish how the guarantees should be construed. Even a
legislature’s rejecting Smith and endorsing certain decisions like Sherbert v.
Verner5 or Wisconsin v. Yoder6 does much less work than might be thought,
because the Court allegedly applied the protections recognized in those
decisions when affording little protection in other contexts.7 It thus should not

* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
3. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Essay, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 885–86 (1994) (“[T]he state should not burden a religious practice
without a compelling reason. That was the rule that prevailed in the Supreme Court from Sherbert
v. Verner in 1963 until just before the Smith case in 1990.”).
4. See infra Part II.D.
5. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
6. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
7. See infra notes 77–98 and accompanying text (discussing Braunfeld in which the Court
claimed to be applying the test later used in Sherbert while not providing much free exercise
protection) and infra notes Part II.D and accompanying text (discussing Lee in which the Court
335
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be surprising that courts interpreting the state RFRAs, which often involve
implementing or following the pre-Smith jurisprudence, have been less
protective than might have been hoped.
Part II of this article addresses the developing free exercise jurisprudence,
noting some of the mixed signals that the Court has sent with respect to the
breadth and depth of those guarantees. Part III addresses some of the state
responses to Smith’s narrow reading of free exercise guarantees and offers
some suggestions about why the state RFRAs have not resulted in the kind of
robust protection of free exercise guarantees that might initially have been
expected. The article concludes that the state RFRA cases illustrate some of the
complexities of attempting to implement a respectful free exercise
jurisprudence and some of the dangers that can arise especially for those with
minority religious views or practices.
II. THE CHANGING FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the
breadth and depth of free exercise guarantees.8 Rather than offer a clear picture
of those guarantees, however, the Court has instead sent mixed messages about
how heavy a burden the state must bear when seeking to limit religious
practices.9 Precisely because the free exercise opinions not only adopted
differing approaches but also made implausible distinctions when attempting to
reconcile the cases previously decided, the jurisprudence prior to Smith was
open to such different interpretations that those loudly proclaiming their wish
to return to the pre-Smith jurisprudence did not thereby provide much guidance
with respect to what they thought free exercise guarantees protected.
A.

The Application of Free Exercise Guarantees

In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court held that the
free exercise guarantees afforded by the First Amendment10 to the United
States Constitution were incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment against
the states.11 Because those guarantees also limited the degree to which states
claimed to be applying the test used in Yoder and Sherbert but not providing robust free exercise
protection).
8. See infra Part II.A–D.
9. See infra notes 77–120 and accompanying text (discussing Braunfeld and Sherbert in
which the Court allegedly used the same test but came up with such different holdings that the
opinions do not seem capable of being reconciled in a plausible way).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”).
11. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First Amendment declares
that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as
incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”).
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could limit religious practices, the Court then had a variety of opportunities to
spell out which burdens states could and could not place on free exercise.
The Cantwell Court explained that the religious freedoms protected by the
First Amendment are quite robust: “Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law.”12 Further, the Constitution protects not
only an individual’s right to believe, but also an individual’s right to act in
accord with conscience.13 That said, the freedom to believe and the freedom to
act in accord with religious belief are not given the same degree of protection.
“[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to
act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”14 Yet,
announcing that religious conduct may be regulated to protect society does not
provide much guidance—the protection of society encompasses a wide range
of threats, from grave dangers to minor inconveniences, and more must be said
before that can be a helpful standard.
B.

The Accuracy of Religious Beliefs

Even before one discusses what the state must show to justify its
limitations on religious exercise, a prior question involves which kinds of
beliefs or activities count as religious for First Amendment purposes. In United
States v. Ballard,15 the Court addressed the degree to which the state could
second-guess the tenets of a particular religion.
Edna and Donald Ballard were convicted of fraud.16 They claimed to have
supernatural powers enabling them to cure the sick.17 Individuals would send
them “money, property, and other things of value,”18 hoping that the
detrimental effects of severe or terminal illness might be avoided. The Ballards

12. Id.
13. Id. (“it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion”).
14. Id. at 303–04.
15. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
16. Id. at 79 (“Respondents were indicted and convicted for using, and conspiring to use, the
mails to defraud. § 215 Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 338, 18 U.S.C.A. § 338; § 37 Criminal Code,
18 U.S.C. § 88, 18 U.S.C.A. § 88.”).
17. See id. at 80 (“Edna W. Ballard and Donald Ballard had, by reason of supernatural
attainments, the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases and to make well persons afflicted
with any diseases, injuries, or ailments.”).
18. See id.
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allegedly knew that they had no power to cure the sick,19 although they argued
that they could not be punished for their religious beliefs.20
The trial court told the jury that its task was not to assess the truth of the
defendants’ beliefs,21 but only to consider whether the defendants believed
what they preached.22 Further, defendants’ counsel did not object to the court’s
direction to the jury that the sincerity of belief was the focus of the inquiry.23
The Ballard Court explained that “[f]reedom of thought . . . embraces the
right to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are
rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths.”24 It thus did not matter that
“[t]he religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not
preposterous, to most people.”25 The Court cautioned that if the Constitution
were to permit those beliefs to be set “before a jury charged with finding their
truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any
sect.”26 For that reason, “the District Court ruled properly when it withheld
from the jury all questions concerning the truth or falsity of the religious
beliefs or doctrines of respondents.”27 Thus, the Constitution does not permit
the state to determine the accuracy of religious beliefs.
C. Which Beliefs Are Religious?
Suppose that an individual has deeply held and well-considered beliefs that
play a central role in her life, even if those beliefs are not part of an organized
set of beliefs including some notion of a supreme being. Would those beliefs
count as religious for free exercise purposes?

19. Id. (“Each of the representations enumerated in the indictment was followed by the
charge that respondents ‘well knew’ it was false.”).
20. Id. at 80–81 (“There was a demurrer and a motion to quash each of which asserted
among other things that the indictment attacked the religious beliefs of respondents and sought to
restrict the free exercise of their religion in violation of the Constitution of the United States.”).
21. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81 (“[I]t is immaterial what these defendants preached or wrote or
taught in their classes. They are not going to be permitted to speculate on the actuality of the
happening of those incidents.”).
22. Id. (“The issue is: Did these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things?
If they did, they should be acquitted.”).
23. Id. at 82 (“[C]ounsel for the defense acquiesced in this treatment of the matter, made no
objection to it during the trial, and indeed treated it without protest as the law of the case
throughout the proceedings prior to the verdict.”).
24. Id. at 86.
25. Id. at 87.
26. Id.
27. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 88. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)
(“[W]hile the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question
whether it is ‘truly held.’ This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in
every case.”).
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While not speaking directly to that point,28 the Court did address whether
an individual had to believe in God in order to be considered a conscientious
objector in Seeger v. United States29 and Welsh v. United States,30 and those
decisions have been interpreted to establish the robustness of free exercise
guarantees.31 However, a subsequent decision involving conscientious
objectors undercut such an interpretation.32
Daniel Seeger refused to submit to induction, claiming to be a
conscientious objector.33 While stating that his refusal to participate in war in
any form was based on religious beliefs, he preferred to leave open whether he
believed in God34 and instead based his beliefs on his reading the works of
various thinkers.35 His views were found to be sincere,36 and the reason for his
denial of conscientious objector status in the district court was that his beliefs
were not tied to a belief in a supreme being.37
The Seeger Court interpreted Congress’s linking the exemption to a
supreme being as Congress’s “merely clarifying the meaning of religious
training and belief so as to embrace all religions and to exclude essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views.”38 The Court further explained
that “under this construction, the test of belief ‘in a relation to a Supreme
28. But cf. Terri Jane Lavi, Note, Free Exercise Challenges to Public School Curricula: Are
States Creating “Enclaves of Totalitarianism” through Compulsory Reading Requirements?, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 301, 321–22 (1988) (discussing “the expansive definition of religion the
Court adopted in Seeger and Welch”).
29. Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
30. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
31. Cf. Steven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion under the Constitution,
31 EMORY L.J. 973, 982 (1982) (“Commentators generally have agreed that the Seeger/Welsh
definition is the constitutional definition of religion, at least for purposes of the Free Exercise
Clause.”).
32. See infra notes 56–72 and accompanying text (discussing Gillette v. United States).
33. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166 (“He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957
after successive annual renewals of his student classification.”). See also id. at 164–65 (“These
cases involve claims of conscientious objectors under § 6(j) of the Universal Military Training
and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958 ed.), which exempts from combatant training and
service in the armed forces of the United States those persons who by reason of their religious
training and belief are conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”).
34. Id. at 166 (“[H]e declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form by reason of his ‘religious’ belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief
in a Supreme Being open, ‘rather than answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.’”).
35. Id. (“He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical
belief in intellectual and moral integrity.”).
36. Id. at 166–67 (“His belief was found to be sincere, honest, and made in good faith; and
his conscientious objection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of which
included research in religious and cultural fields.”).
37. Id. at 167 (“Seeger’s claim, however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a
‘belief in a relation to a Supreme Being’ as required by § 6(j) of the Act.”).
38. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165–66.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

340

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV:335

Being’ is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.”39 Because Seeger’s
opposition to war operated the same way within his belief system as it would
in a system closely linked to a belief in a supreme being, Seeger had to be
awarded conscientious objector status.40
Elliot Welsh II was convicted of refusing to be drafted into the army.41 He
challenged that conviction because he claimed to be a conscientious objector.42
While Welsh “held deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars
where people were killed,”43 he denied that those beliefs were religious44
except in the ethical sense of that word.45
One of the questions at hand was whether Welsh’s beliefs were
appropriately characterized as “essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code,”46 especially because
Welsh admitted that his views were based in part on his perceptions of world
events.47 But the Court rejected that the exclusion from the exemption should
apply “to exclude those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and
foreign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to participation in
all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public
policy.”48 The Court instead interpreted the exclusion to apply to “those whose
beliefs are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest at all
upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon

39. Id.
40. See id. at 187 (“It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what his beliefs were
with regard to the usual understanding of the term ‘Supreme Being.’ But as we have said
Congress did not intend that to be the test. We therefore affirm the judgment in No. 50.”).
41. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970) (“The petitioner, Elliott Ashton Welsh
II, was convicted by a United States District Judge of refusing to submit to induction into the
Armed Forces in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a), and was on June 1, 1966, sentenced to
imprisonment for three years.”).
42. Id. (“One of petitioner’s defenses to the prosecution was that § 6(j) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act exempted him from combat and noncombat service because he
was ‘by reason of religious training and belief . . . conscientiously opposed to participation in war
in any form.’”).
43. Id. at 337.
44. Id. at 341 (“Welsh was far more insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that his
views were religious.”).
45. Id. (“Although he originally characterized his beliefs as nonreligious, he later upon
reflection wrote a long and thoughtful letter to his Appeal Board in which he declared that his
beliefs were ‘certainly religious in the ethical sense of the word.’”).
46. Id. at 342.
47. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342 (“Welsh’s conscientious objection to war was undeniably based
in part on his perception of world politics.”).
48. Id.
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considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency.”49 Believing “[t]he
controlling facts in this case . . . strikingly similar to those in Seeger,”50 the
Welsh Court found that Welsh should also be classified as a conscientious
objector.51
Justice Harlan concurred in the result, which he believed was
constitutionally required.52 Justice White in his dissent suggested that
conscientious objector status might be required as a matter of free exercise,53
although he did not believe that nonreligionists would also have to be afforded
an exemption.54
Together, Welsh and Seeger might seem to suggest robust free exercise
protection.55 Yet, Gillette v. United States56 undermines such an interpretation.
Guy Gillette and Louis Negre were each convicted of refusing to serve
their country in war,57 although each had claimed to have conscientious

49. Id. at 342–43.
50. Id. at 335.
51. Id. at 343–44 (“[W]e think Welsh was clearly entitled to a conscientious objector
exemption. Section 6(j) requires no more. That section exempts from military service all those
whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them
no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.”).
52. Id. at 344–45 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I therefore find myself unable to escape facing
the constitutional issue that this case squarely presents: whether § 6(j) in limiting this draft
exemption to those opposed to war in general because of theistic beliefs runs afoul of the
religious clauses of the First Amendment. For reasons later appearing I believe it does, and on
that basis I concur in the judgment reversing this conviction.”).
53. Cf. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 369–70 (White, J., dissenting) (“Congress may have granted the
exemption because otherwise religious objectors would be forced into conduct that their religions
forbid and because in the view of Congress to deny the exemption would violate the Free
Exercise Clause or at least raise grave problems in this respect.”). See also id. at 373 (White, J.,
dissenting) (“[F]ree exercise values prompt Congress to relieve religious believers from the
burdens of the law at least in those instances where the law is not merely prohibitory but
commands the performance of military duties that are forbidden by a man’s religion.”).
54. Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) (“Surely a statutory exemption for religionists required
by the Free Exercise Clause is not an invalid establishment because it fails to include nonreligious
believers as well.”).
55. But see Matthew D. Krueger, Note, Respecting Religious Liberty: Why RLUIPA Does
Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1179, 1191 (2005) (“While the broad
Seeger/Welsh view of ‘religion’ has the virtue of tolerance—ensuring that claimants holding
untraditional or unusual beliefs are not neglected—this view tends to diminish the freedom
afforded to claimants. This is because legislatures and courts are unlikely to offer both strong
protections from general laws and wide accessibility to those protections.”).
56. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
57. See id. at 439 (“[P]etitioner Gillette was convicted of willful failure to report for
induction into the armed forces.”). See id. at 440 (“[P]etitioner Negre, after induction into the
Army, completion of basic training, and receipt of orders for Vietnam duty commenced
proceedings looking to his discharge as a conscientious objector to war.”).
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objections to serving in the Vietnam War.58 Sincerity of belief was not at
issue.59 Further, recognizing that “these petitioners’ beliefs concerning war are
‘religious’ in nature,”60 the Court did not base its decision on the exclusion
related to “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code.”61 Nonetheless, the Court suggested that Congress
did not intend to offer conscientious objector status to those objecting to a
particular war rather than to war in general.62
Yet, such a distinction raises other difficulties because some faith
traditions object to war as a general matter and other traditions only object to
unjust wars, and Congress seemed to be respecting free exercise concerns for
certain traditions but not others.63 The Court noted that the challenged section
“on its face, simply does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or
religious belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning war.”64 Because that
was so, the Court interpreted the petitioners’ contention to be that “the special
statutory status accorded conscientious objection to all war, but not objection
to a particular war, works a de facto discrimination among religions,”65 a
contention that could not “simply be brushed aside.”66 However, because
differentiating between objections to all wars and to a particular war “serves a
number of valid purposes having nothing to do with a design to foster or favor
any sect, religion, or cluster of religions,”67 and because “valid neutral reasons

58. Id. at 439 (“In support of his unsuccessful request for classification as a conscientious
objector, this petitioner had stated his willingness to participate in a war of national defense or a
war sponsored by the United Nations as a peace-keeping measure, but declared his opposition to
American military operations in Vietnam, which he characterized as ‘unjust.’”). Id. at 440–41
(“Negre, a devout Catholic, believes that it is his duty as a faithful Catholic to discriminate
between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars, and to forswear participation in the latter. His assessment of the
Vietnam conflict as an unjust war became clear in his mind after completion of infantry training,
and Negre is now firmly of the view that any personal involvement in that war would contravene
his conscience and ‘all that I had been taught in my religious training.’”).
59. Id. at 440 (“Gillette’s defense to the criminal charge [was] rejected, not because of doubt
about the sincerity or the religious character of petitioner’s objection to military service but
because his objection ran to a particular war. . . . [N]o question is raised as to the sincerity or the
religious quality of [Negre’s] views.”).
60. Id. at 447.
61. Id.
62. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 447 (“[W]e hold that Congress intended to exempt persons who
oppose participating in all war—‘participation in war in any form’—and that persons who object
solely to participation in a particular war are not within the purview of the exempting section,
even though the latter objection may have such roots in a claimant’s conscience and personality
that it is ‘religious’ in character.”).
63. Id. at 448–49, 451–52.
64. Id. at 450.
65. Id. at 451–52.
66. Id. at 452.
67. Id.
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exist for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war, . . . the section therefore
cannot be said to reflect a religious preference.”68 The Court mentioned the
nation’s religious diversity,69 suggesting that permitting objections to a war to
serve as a basis for conscientious objection would create an even greater
potential for indeterminacy and unfairness.70
The Court expressly addressed the petitioners’ free exercise claim,
suggesting that the government’s “incidental burdens felt by persons in
petitioners’ position are strictly justified by substantial governmental interests
that relate directly to the very impacts questioned.”71 For example, the Court
noted the concern “of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service
. . . that exemption of objectors to particular wars would weaken the resolve of
those who otherwise would feel themselves bound to serve despite personal
cost, uneasiness at the prospect of violence, or even serious moral reservations
or policy objections concerning the particular conflict.”72 Thus, the Court
accepted that according conscientious objector status to those with religious
objections to particular wars might have too severe an impact on the conduct of
the war.
Perhaps Gillette can be explained by talking about the difficulty in
distinguishing between those with sincere religious objections to the war and
those with merely political objections to it.73 Yet, the Court accepted that
political or moral objections to war as a general matter that were firmly held
could be the basis of conscientious objector status in Welsh,74 so the Court
should presumably be taken at its word that it believed a different decision
68. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 454.
69. Id. at 457 (“Ours is a Nation of enormous heterogeneity in respect of political views,
moral codes, and religious persuasions.”).
70. See id. at 458 (“While the danger of erratic decision making unfortunately exists in any
system of conscription that takes individual differences into account, no doubt the dangers would
be enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate scope were honored in theory.”); See
also id. (discussing “the interest in fairness”).
71. Id. at 462.
72. Id. at 459–60.
73. Cf. Charles J. Reid, Jr., John T. Noonan, Jr., on the Catholic Conscience and War:
Negre v. Larsen, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 881, 954 (2001) (“The difficulties in distinguishing
between religious dissenters to a particular war and those dissenting on political grounds, the
[Gillette] Court suggested, ‘are considerable.’”); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1295–96 (1994) (“[W]e might think it unreasonable for secular objectors to
build moral identities around distinctions that they themselves recognize as matters inviting
political resolution. This argument carries less weight with respect to religious objectors, since
the state may no more pass upon the reasonableness of religious distinctions among just and
unjust wars than it may pass upon the reasonableness of religious beliefs about wearing
yarmulkes or eating beef on Friday. Those who accept this line of reasoning might endorse
Gillette while rejecting Negre.”).
74. See supra notes 37–50 and accompanying text (discussing Welsh).
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might seriously impair the war effort.75 In any event, Gillette does not
represent a particularly robust protection of religious liberty.76
D. The Robustness of Free Exercise Guarantees
While claiming to be applying the same guarantees, the Court seems to
vary the strength of the protections afforded under the Free Exercise Clause in
different cases. In Braunfeld v. Brown,77 the Court discussed whether Sunday
closing laws could be applied to Philadelphia retail merchants who, because of
sincere religious belief, had to close their establishments on a day other than
Sunday. “Each of the appellants is a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith,
which requires the closing of their places of business and a total abstention
from all manner of work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each
Saturday.”78 They “had previously kept their places of business open on
Sunday, [and] . . . each of [the] appellants had done a substantial amount of
business on Sunday, compensating somewhat for their closing on Saturday.”79
The appellants claimed that forcing them to be closed on Sunday as well “will
result in impairing the ability of all appellants to earn a livelihood and will
render appellant Braunfeld unable to continue in his business, thereby losing
his capital investment.”80 Enforcement of the law “will either compel
appellants to give up their Sabbath observance, a basic tenet of the Orthodox
Jewish faith, or will put appellants at a serious economic disadvantage if they
continue to adhere to their Sabbath.”81
The Braunfeld Court explained that while free exercise guarantees are
robust and the “freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute,”82 it
is nonetheless true that “the freedom to act, even when the action is in accord
with one’s religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative
restrictions.”83 Because “the statute at bar does not make unlawful any
religious practices of appellants”84 but instead merely “operates so as to make
75. Arlin M. Adams & Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the
Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 339 (1988) (noting that “one of
the most compelling state interests is that of government in protecting its citizens and borders
through military conscription”).
76. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39
PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1206 (2013) (suggesting that Gillette represents a less robust protection of
religious liberty).
77. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
78. Id. at 601.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 602.
82. Id. at 603.
83. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 603 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04, 306
(1940)).
84. Id. at 605.
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the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive,”85 the law at issue was
less burdensome than some that had been upheld in the past.86 Further, the
Sunday closing law did not disadvantage “all members of the Orthodox Jewish
faith but only those who believe it necessary to work on Sunday.”87 For those
disadvantaged, the Court reasoned that the forced choice was not between
practicing one’s religion and facing criminal penalty,88 but merely between
choosing one kind of work versus another.89
The Braunfeld Court justified its approach by noting that “we are a
cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious
preference.”90 Such diversity creates practical difficulties, and “it cannot be
expected, much less required, that legislators enact no law regulating conduct
that may in some way result in an economic disadvantage to some religious
sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various
religions.”91 A different analysis would be required if the legislation were
targeting religion.92
The Court offered a standard by which to determine whether the state was
justified in burdening free exercise: “[I]f the State regulates conduct by
enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to
advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden
on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden.”93 Yet, it was not clear that the Sunday
closing law passed muster even in light of the suggested standard, because the
state might have accomplished its goals by requiring a day of rest but not

85. Id.
86. See id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) and Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 605 (“And even these are not faced with as serious a choice as forsaking their
religious practices or subjecting themselves to criminal prosecution.”).
89. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605–06 (“Fully recognizing that the alternatives open to
appellants and others similarly situated—retaining their present occupations and incurring
economic disadvantage or engaging in some other commercial activity which does not call for
either Saturday or Sunday labor—may well result in some financial sacrifice in order to observe
their religious beliefs, still the option is wholly different than when the legislation attempts to
make a religious practice itself unlawful.”).
90. Id. at 606.
91. Id. at 606–07.
92. Id. at 607 (“If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.”)
93. Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304–05 (1940)).
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mandating that it be Sunday.94 Indeed, several states had adopted such an
approach,95 although the Court did not believe such a solution required96
because there would be added compliance costs were such an approach
implemented.97 In addition, such an approach might afford those open on
Sunday with an economic advantage.98
Two years after Braunfeld’s tepid enforcement of free exercise
guarantees,99 the Court decided Sherbert v. Verner.100 The case involved a free
exercise challenge by Adell Sherbert, who was denied unemployment
compensation after having been fired because she, as a Seventh Day Adventist,
could not work on Saturdays without violating her religious convictions.101
Sherbert could not find other employment that did not require her to work
on Saturdays.102 The South Carolina Employment Security Commission
rejected that her faith-based refusal to accept such employment qualified as
“good cause” justifying her not accepting such a job offer.103 For that reason,
her claim for unemployment compensation was denied.104 She unsuccessfully

94. Id. at 608 (“They contend that the State should cut an exception from the Sunday labor
proscription for those people who, because of religious conviction, observe a day of rest other
than Sunday.”).
95. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608 (“A number of states provide such an exemption, and this
may well be the wiser solution to the problem.”).
96. Cf. id. (“But our concern is not with the wisdom of legislation but with its constitutional
limitation.”).
97. Id. (“[T]o permit the exemption might well undermine the State’s goal of providing a
day that, as best possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity. . . .
[E]nforcement problems would be more difficult since there would be two or more days to police
rather than one and it would be more difficult to observe whether violations were occurring.”).
98. Id. at 608–09 (“To allow only people who rest on a day other than Sunday to keep their
businesses open on that day might well provide these people with an economic advantage over
their competitors who must remain closed on that day; this might cause the Sunday-observers to
complain that their religions are being discriminated against.”).
99. Donald Falk, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Bulldozing
First Amendment Protection of Indian Sacred Lands, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 564 (1989)
(describing Braunfeld’s free exercise protection as “weak”).
100. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
101. Id. at 399 (“Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was discharged
by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her
faith.”).
102. Id. at 399–400 (“[S]he was unable to obtain other employment because from
conscientious scruples she would not take Saturday work.”).
103. Id. at 401 (“The appellee Employment Security Commission, in administrative
proceedings under the statute, found that appellant’s restriction upon her availability for Saturday
work brought her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail,
without good cause, to accept ‘suitable work when offered . . . by the employment office or the
employer . . .’”).
104. See id. at 399–400.
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challenged that denial in the state courts.105 The South Carolina Supreme Court
held that “appellant’s ineligibility infringed no constitutional liberties because
such a construction of the statute ‘places no restriction upon the appellant’s
freedom of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her
right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the
dictates of her conscience.’”106
When reviewing the South Carolina Supreme Court decision, the United
States Supreme Court began its analysis by asking whether Sherbert’s
“disqualification as a beneficiary . . . [infringed upon] her constitutional rights
of free exercise.”107 The Court explained that it did,108 because “the pressure
upon her to forego that [religious] practice is unmistakable.”109 Basically, she
was put in the position of having “to choose between following the precepts of
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”110 The
Court analogized the choice she faced to one involving a government-imposed
penalty: “Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against
appellant for her Saturday worship.”111
Yet, it would seem that the government had required the same kind of
forced choice in Braunfeld.112 The Sherbert Court distinguished the two cases:
[T]he state interest asserted in the present case is wholly dissimilar to the
interests which were found to justify the less direct burden upon religious
practices in Braunfeld v. Brown. The Court recognized that the Sunday closing
law which that decision sustained undoubtedly served ‘to make the practice of
113
(the Orthodox Jewish merchants’) religious beliefs more expensive.’ But the
statute was nevertheless saved by a countervailing factor which finds no
equivalent in the instant case—a strong state interest in providing one uniform
day of rest for all workers. That secular objective could be achieved, the Court
found, only by declaring Sunday to be that day of rest. Requiring exemptions

105. See id. at 401.
106. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401 (citing Union Naval Stores Co. v. United States, 240 U.S. 286,
303–04 (1916) and Sherbert v. Verner, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (S.C. 1962)).
107. Id. at 403.
108. Id. (In determining whether Sherbert’s disqualification infringed upon her rights, the
United States Supreme Court found “it is clear that it does.”).
109. Id. at 404.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–06 (1961) (“[T]he alternatives open to
appellants and others similarly situated-retaining their present occupations and incurring
economic disadvantage or engaging in some other commercial activity which does not call for
either Saturday or Sunday labor-may well result in some financial sacrifice in order to observe
their religious beliefs.”).
113. Id. at 605.
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for Sabbatarians, while theoretically possible, appeared to present an
administrative problem of such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so
great a competitive advantage, that such a requirement would have rendered
the entire statutory scheme unworkable. In the present case no such
justifications underlie the determination of the state court that appellant’s
114
religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits.

Thus, the Sherbert Court suggests that the law at issue in Braunfeld was
narrowly drawn to promote compelling state interests, whereas the denial of
unemployment benefits in Sherbert did not. Yet, such a characterization of the
state interests implicated in Braunfeld is not plausible.115 For example, when
the Braunfeld Court noted that some states required a day of rest without
requiring that everyone rest on Sunday,116 the Court offered an example of
such a statute117 without describing the experiences of those states. But no
evidence was presented suggesting that those states incurred great difficulty
when affording such flexibility,118 which undercuts the claim that the state’s
interest in Sunday closing laws was compelling.119 But that makes Sherbert
and Braunfeld difficult to reconcile, as some of the justices pointed out.120

114. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408–09.
115. See Steven M. Rosato, Saving Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” Amendment: Sharia Law in
the West and Suggestions to Protect Similar State Legislation from Constitutional Attack, 44
SETON HALL L. REV. 659, 672 (2014) (“Sherbert v. Verner . . . seems in direct conflict with the
holding in Braunfeld.”).
116. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608.
117. See id. at 608 n.5 (citing IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-4301).
118. See id. at 614–15 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (“It is also true that a
majority—21 of the 34 States which have general Sunday regulations have exemptions of this
kind. We are not told that those States are significantly noisier, or that their police are
significantly more burdened, than Pennsylvania’s.”).
119. See id. at 613–614 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (“What, then, is the
compelling state interest which impels the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to impede appellants’
freedom of worship? What overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitutional scale that it
justifies this substantial, though indirect, limitation of appellants’ freedom? . . . It is the mere
convenience of having everyone rest on the same day. It is to defend this interest that the Court
holds that a State need not follow the alternative route of granting an exemption for those who in
good faith observe a day of rest other than Sunday.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 561
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“If the ‘free exercise’ of religion were subject to reasonable
regulations, as it is under some constitutions, or if all laws ‘respecting the establishment of
religion’ were not proscribed, I could understand how rational men, representing a predominantly
Christian civilization, might think these Sunday laws did not unreasonably interfere with
anyone’s free exercise of religion and took no step toward a burdensome establishment of any
religion. But that is not the premise from which we start.”); Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment,
Restoring Religious Freedom to the Workplace: Title VII, RFRA and Religious Accommodation,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2513, 2530 (1996) (describing the Braunfeld Court as “applying rational basis
review”).
120. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 417 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (“I
cannot agree that today’s decision can stand consistently with Braunfeld v. Brown.”); id. at 421
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The line of cases including Braunfeld, Sherbert, and the conscientious
objector cases121 makes it somewhat difficult to tell how heavily free exercise
concerns are weighed, or even whether one standard is being used that can
explain all of these cases. The lack of clarity is exacerbated in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,122 because of how the Court treats the distinction between a
philosophical or merely personal moral code on the one hand and religious
views on the other.
Yoder involved a Wisconsin law requiring children to attend school until
their sixteenth birthday.123 Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy were
Amish who declined to send their fourteen- or fifteen-year-old children to
public school beyond the eighth grade,124 because they believed that sending
their children to high school not only violated their religious convictions125 but
would “endanger their own salvation and that of their children.”126 The
sincerity of belief was not at issue.127
The respondents believed that high school inculcated the wrong values by
“emphasiz[ing] intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction,
competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students.”128 In
contrast, “Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of
‘goodness,’ rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical
knowledge, community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from,
rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society.”129 While the
Amish believed that “their children must have basic skills in the ‘three R’s’ in
order to read the Bible, to be good farmers and citizens, and to be able to deal
with non-Amish people when necessary in the course of daily affairs,”130 they
did not want their children to attend high school. Doing so would take the

(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[D]espite the Court’s protestations to the contrary, the decision
necessarily overrules Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, which held that it did not offend the
‘Free Exercise’ Clause of the Constitution for a State to forbid a Sabbatarian to do business on
Sunday.”).
121. See supra notes 25–72 and accompanying text (discussing the conscientious objector
cases).
122. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
123. Id. at 207 (“Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their
children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16.”).
124. Id. (“[R]espondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after
they complete the eighth grade.”).
125. Id. at 209 (“[R]espondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish
communities generally, that their children’s attendance at high school, public or private, was
contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.”).
126. Id.
127. Id. (“The State stipulated that respondents’ religious beliefs were sincere.”).
128. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 212.
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children “away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the
crucial and formative adolescent period of life [d]uring [which] . . . the
children must acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance
and the specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or
housewife.”131
The Yoder Court explained that “only those interests of the highest order
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion.”132 But such a robust standard has to be cabined in some
way and the Court suggested that “[a] way of life, however virtuous and
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of
education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection
of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.”133
Determining which beliefs are religious and which are not “present[s] a
most delicate question.”134 The Court offered an example. “[I]f the Amish
asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the
contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau
rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond,
their claims would not rest on a religious basis.”135 Because “Thoreau’s choice
was philosophical and personal rather than religious, . . . such belief does not
rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.”136 Yet, the Court’s discussion of
Thoreau was confusing, because his values were deeply held,137 and the Court
had suggested in the conscientious objector cases that deeply held beliefs and
values might be treated as religious.138
What criteria are used to determine whether particular beliefs are “not
merely a matter of personal preference?”139 The Court noted that “the
traditional way of life of the Amish is . . . of deep religious conviction, shared
by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.”140 It was not
clear whether any of these factors was necessary or sufficient to trigger free

131. Id. at 211.
132. Id. at 215.
133. Id.
134. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
135. Id. at 216.
136. Id.
137. See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory
of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV. 9,
56 (2001) (suggesting that Thoreau’s values were “deeply held”).
138. See supra notes 25–51 and accompanying text (discussing Seeger and Welsh).
139. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
140. Id.
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exercise protection, although the Court was obviously satisfied that a belief
meeting all of these criteria was protected by the applicable guarantees.141
Accepting that the Amish beliefs and values were religious in nature, the
Court next addressed whether the action at issue in the case (the Amish
keeping their children out of school) was protected by free exercise guarantees.
While acknowledging that “activities of individuals, even when religiously
based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their
undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the
Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers,” citing both
Braunfeld and Gillette,142 the Court rejected that “religiously grounded conduct
is always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.”143 Noting that
“there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under
regulations of general applicability,” citing Sherbert,144 the Court explained
that “[w]here fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake”145 the
Court must “searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote .
. . and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing
the claimed . . . exemption.”146 Rejecting the state’s claim that “upon leaving
the Amish community Amish children, with their practical agricultural training
and habits of industry and self-reliance, would become burdens on society
because of educational shortcomings,”147 the Court held that “the First and
Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling respondents to
cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16.”148
The Yoder Court seemed to strike a blow for tolerance and diversity when
suggesting that “[a] way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no
rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different.”149
Perhaps as a way of showing that Congress also believed that the Amish
deserved to be exempted from some of the requirements of generally
applicable laws, the Court noted that “Congress itself recognized their self-

141. See Destyn D. Stallings, Comment, A Tough Pill to Swallow: Whether the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act Obligates Catholic Organizations to Cover Their Employees’
Prescription Contraceptives, 48 TULSA L. REV. 117, 127 (2012) (noting that “the belief satisfied
all three criteria”).
142. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) and
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)).
143. Id. at 219–20.
144. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
145. Id. at 221
146. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
147. Id. at 224.
148. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
149. Id. at 224.
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sufficiency by authorizing exemption of such groups as the Amish from the
obligation to pay social security taxes.”150
Yoder raises a number of issues including how to differentiate between a
religious way of life and mere personal preferences. For example, how should
religiously based beliefs be handled if they appear idiosyncratic or at least not
generally held by those professing that faith? Thomas v. Review Board of
Indiana Employment Security Division151 seemed to provide a partial answer.
At issue in Thomas was whether Eddie Thomas was entitled to receive
unemployment benefits after he quit his job rather than produce armaments in
violation of conscience.152 He applied for unemployment benefits, explaining
why he had quit.153 Although a friend of the same faith tradition had advised
him that the work to which he had been assigned was not “unscriptural,”154
Thomas disagreed.155
Thomas was denied unemployment benefits.156 When explaining why that
denial did not offend free exercise guarantees, the Indiana Supreme Court
explained that “the belief was more ‘personal philosophical choice’ than
religious belief,”157 although the Indiana court also suggested that “a
termination motivated by religion is not for ‘good cause’ objectively related to
the work.”158
The Thomas Court explained that while “[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion
are protected by the Free Exercise Clause,”159 a separate question involves
which beliefs are thereby protected. “The determination of what is a ‘religious’

150. Id. at 222.
151. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
152. Id. at 709 (“Thomas terminated his employment in the Blaw-Knox Foundry &
Machinery Co. when he was transferred from the roll foundry to a department that produced
turrets for military tanks. He claimed his religious beliefs prevented him from participating in the
production of war materials.”).
153. Id. at 710–11 (“Thomas applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the
Indiana Employment Security Act. At an administrative hearing where he was not represented by
counsel, he testified that he believed that contributing to the production of arms violated his
religion.”).
154. Id. at 711.
155. Id. (“Thomas was not able to ‘rest with’ this view, however. He concluded that his
friend’s view was based upon a less strict reading of Witnesses’ principles than his own.”).
156. Id. at 712 (“The Review Board adopted the referee’s findings and conclusions, and
affirmed the denial of benefits.”).
157. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713; See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div.,
391 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (Ind. 1979) (“A personal philosophical choice rather than a religious
choice, does not rise to the level of a first amendment claim of religious expression.”) (citing
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972)).
158. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713; See also Thomas, 391 N.E.2d at 1131 (“The disqualifying
statute imposes only an indirect burden, if any, on claimant’s free exercise of his religion. It
makes no religious practice unlawful.”).
159. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713.
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belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task.”160
Nonetheless, when attempting to ascertain whether a particular practice was
religious, certain modes of inquiry are not permissible. For example, “the
resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the
particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit
First Amendment protection.”161 In explaining why the Indiana Supreme Court
had relied too much on the testimony of Thomas’s friend that the work at issue
was permissible, the Thomas Court noted that “[i]ntrafaith differences . . . are
not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process
is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion
Clauses.”162
Acknowledging that “an asserted claim [might be] so bizarre, so clearly
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free
Exercise Clause,”163 the Court nonetheless explained that “it is not within the
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or
his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common
faith.”164 After all, “[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”165
Because “[o]n this record, it is clear that Thomas terminated his employment
for religious reasons,”166 the state had a heavy burden insofar as it was going to
justify the benefit denial. The Court explained that “a person may not be
compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and
participation in an otherwise available public program.”167 In this case, “the
employee was put to a choice between fidelity to religious belief or cessation
of work,”168 and “the interests advanced by the State do not justify the burden
placed on free exercise of religion.”169
A year after supporting free exercise guarantees in Thomas, the Court
seemed to undermine those very guarantees in United States v. Lee,170 where
the Court examined whether an Amish employer refusing to pay into social
160. Id. at 714.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 715.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 716.
165. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 717.
169. Id. at 719. See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Com’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146
(1987) (striking down Florida’s refusal to award unemployment benefits to an individual who
was unemployed due to her refusal to work on her Sabbath); Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t. of Emp’t Sec.,
489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (striking down Illinois’s refusal to award unemployment benefits to an
individual who refused to work on Sunday as a matter of religious conviction).
170. United States v. Edwin D. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982).
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security could be punished without thereby violating constitutional guarantees.
The Court first determined that Lee was not exempt under the applicable
statue, construing the “exemption . . . [as] available only to self-employed
individuals and . . . not . . . to employers or employees.”171 But that meant that
Lee would only be successful if free exercise guarantees required that he be
exempted.172
The conflict arose because the “Amish believe that there is a religiously
based obligation to provide for their fellow members the kind of assistance
contemplated by the social security system.”173 The sincerity of that belief was
not challenged,174 although the government had contended that “payment of
social security taxes will not threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief
or observance.”175 But the state cannot be an arbiter of what a particular
religion requires,176 and the Court accepted as accurate that “payment and
receipt of social security benefits is forbidden by the Amish faith.”177
In discussing the states’ implicated interests, the Court noted that “[t]he
social security system in the United States serves the public interest by
providing a comprehensive insurance system with a variety of benefits
available to all participants, with costs shared by employers and employees.”178
Because the “social security system is by far the largest domestic governmental
program in the United States today, distributing approximately $11 billion
monthly to 36 million Americans,”179 the Court reasoned that “the
Government’s interest in assuring mandatory and continuous participation in
and contribution to the social security system is very high.”180 But that speaks
to the government maintenance of the system as a general matter, and the
important determination was “whether accommodating the Amish belief will
unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest.”181
The Court reasoned that the issues in Lee were quite different from those
presented in Yoder, because “it would be difficult to accommodate the
comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a
171. Id. at 256.
172. Id. (“Thus any exemption from payment of the employer’s share of social security taxes
must come from a constitutionally required exemption.”).
173. Id. at 257.
174. Id. (“the Government does not challenge the sincerity of this belief”).
175. Id.
176. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 257 (“It is not within ‘the judicial function and judicial
competence,’ however, to determine whether appellee or the Government has the proper
interpretation of the Amish faith; ‘[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.’” (citing
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981))).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 258.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 258–59.
181. Id. at 259.
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wide variety of religious beliefs.”182 Further, “[t]here is no principled way . . .
for purposes of this case to distinguish between general taxes and those
imposed under the Social Security Act.”183 But that meant that if Lee were
exempted then if “a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain
percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related
activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt
from paying that percentage of the income tax.”184 The Court then explained
that because the “tax system could not function if denominations were allowed
to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that
violates their religious belief”185 and “[b]ecause the broad public interest in
maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in
conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax.”186 The
tax system would itself be undermined were the Court to recognize a right to a
religious exemption in this case, so Lee’s challenge on constitutional grounds
was rejected.
In what has been described as a decision representing the virtual
abandonment of free exercise protection,187 the Court decided Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, which
addressed “whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits
the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach
of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the
State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs
because of such religiously inspired use.”188 Alfred Smith and Galen Black
were fired from their employment with a private drug rehabilitation
organization because they used peyote as part of a religious ritual.189 They
were denied unemployment compensation because their firing had been for
cause.190

182. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259–60.
183. Id. at 260.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 231 (1991) (discussing “the virtual abandonment of the Free
Exercise Clause in the . . . case of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith”).
188. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
189. Id. (“Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black . . . were fired from their jobs with a
private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at
a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are members.”).
190. Id. (“When respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division . . . for
unemployment compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had
been discharged for work-related ‘misconduct.’”).
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Oregon criminalized the use of peyote even for religious purposes,191 and
the respondents argued that “their religious motivation for using peyote places
them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their
religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who
use the drug for other reasons.”192 The Smith Court denied that “an individual’s
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate,”193 interpreting the
prevailing jurisprudence to be that “the First Amendment bars application of a
neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action . . . [only if]
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections”194 is implicated. For example, it read Cantwell as involving
freedom of religion and freedom of speech195 and Yoder as freedom of religion
plus the parents’ freedom to direct the education of their children.196 The Court
contrasted those cases with “[t]he present case [which] does not present such a
hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any
communicative activity or parental right.”197
While Sherbert and Thomas might seem to suggest a different rule, the
Court claimed that it had “never invalidated any governmental action on the
basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation.”198
That Smith was also an unemployment compensation case did not faze the
Court199—this case was distinguishable because the others did not “require
exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law.”200
The Smith Court then discussed why it did not believe strict scrutiny
appropriate in this kind of free exercise case, noting that the “‘compelling
government interest’ requirement seems benign, because it is familiar from
other fields.”201 But its use in the free exercise context “would produce . . . a
private right to ignore generally applicable laws . . . [which would be] a
constitutional anomaly.”202 The Court also worried about the breadth of the
191. Id. at 876 (“Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote.”).
192. Id. at 878.
193. Id. at 878–79.
194. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 882.
198. Id. at 883.
199. Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“We held, however, in Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988) (Smith I), that whether a State may,
consistent with federal law, deny unemployment compensation benefits to persons for their
religious use of peyote depends on whether the State, as a matter of state law, has criminalized the
underlying conduct. See id. at 670–72.”)
200. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
201. Id. at 885–86.
202. Id. at 886.
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protections that might thereby be accorded, noting that free exercise
protections could not be limited to religious beliefs of central importance. “It is
no more appropriate for judges to determine the ‘centrality’ of religious beliefs
before applying a ‘compelling interest’ test in the free exercise field, than it
would be for them to determine the ‘importance’ of ideas before applying the
‘compelling interest’ test in the free speech field.”203 The Court reasoned that
“[i]f the ‘compelling interest’ test is to be applied at all, then, it must be
applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously
commanded,”204 and warned that such an application would result in striking
down a variety of laws.205
Congress reacted to Smith206 by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA),207 which was intended to require both state and federal
governments to meet a very difficult test in order to justify their burdening free
exercise rights.208 This difficult test would be triggered even when the
government was not targeting religious practice but, instead, was burdening
that practice as a result of a “rule of general applicability.”209 Congress
specifically referred to the test used in Sherbert and Yoder, requiring that it be
used to evaluate whether government burdening of free exercise was
permissible.210
The constitutionality of that act was tested in City of Boerne v. Flores.211
At issue was a denial of a building permit to a church wishing to expand its
facilities in the city of Boerne, Texas.212 The denial was challenged as a
violation of RFRA.213 The Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional, at least

203. Id. at 886–87.
204. Id. at 888.
205. Id. (“[I]f ‘compelling interest’ really means what it says (and watering it down here
would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test.”).
206. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–13 (1997) (“Congress enacted RFRA in
direct response to the Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).”).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2012).
208. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 507 (“RFRA prohibits ‘[g]overnment’ from ‘substantially
burden[ing]’ a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden ‘(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that . . .
interest.’ 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1. RFRA’s mandate applies to any branch of Federal or State
Government.”).
209. Id.
210. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 U.S. 2751, 2784–85 (2014).
211. Flores, 521 U.S. at 507.
212. Id. at 511 (“A decision by local zoning authorities to deny a church a building permit
was challenged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.”).
213. Id. at 512 (“The Archbishop relied upon RFRA as one basis for relief from the refusal to
issue the permit.”).
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as applied to the states.214 That caused the state legislatures to react by enacting
their own state versions of RFRA in an effort to afford more protection to the
free exercise of religion.
III. STATE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACTS
In response to the Smith Court’s narrow reading of free exercise guarantees
and the Flores Court’s striking down RFRA as applied to the states, various
state legislatures passed state religious freedom restoration acts.215 While the
acts vary in language,216 they are all designed to correct Smith’s alleged
undermining of free exercise protections.217 Yet, the state RFRAs have proven
to be less protective than might originally have been thought,218 and it is
helpful to consider a few of the state cases litigated under the state RFRAs to
understand why that is so.
A.

Freeman

Florida has had substantial litigation219 under its state RFRA,220 and it may
be helpful to understand how that statute has been interpreted. Consider

214. See id. at 536 (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of
powers and the federal balance.”).
215. See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 787, 820 n.165 (2014) (“In response to Smith and City of Boerne, a number of post-Smith
state legislative acts or constitutional amendments provided increased protections for religious
freedom.”).
216. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55
S.D. L. REV. 466, 478–79 (2010) (discussing some of the differences among the state RFRAs).
217. See id. at 466 (“Smith, as everyone knows, dramatically narrowed the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause.”).
218. Id. at 467 (“In most jurisdictions, plaintiffs have not won a single state RFRA case
litigated to judgment. To be sure, some states have seen significant state RFRA litigation and
there have been some very important victories. But in many states, state RFRAs seem to exist
almost entirely on the books.”).
219. Id. at 481 (“Florida passed its RFRA early; it has seen substantial litigation. Yet of all
the claims asserted over the years, only a single state Florida RFRA claim litigated to judgment
has won.”).
220. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03
1) The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that government may
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person:
(a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(2) A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may
assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate
relief.
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Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles,221 which
involved a challenge to a denial of a driver’s license because Sultaana Lakiana
Myke Freeman “refused to have her picture taken without her veil.”222
Freeman was permitted to wear her veil when she was photographed for her
Illinois driver’s license,223 but Florida law requires a “‘fullface’ photograph of
the license holder.”224 She was informed that she could not get a license unless
she were willing to have a photograph taken without a veil,225 which she
testified was simply not an option.226
An expert for the state testified that “where the Department had
accommodated the belief by having a female photographer and no males
present, a Muslim woman could have her license photograph taken.”227 An
expert for Freeman testified that “Muslim women must veil themselves and
that . . . the doctrine of necessity, found in Islamic law, [could not be] applied
to [permit] removing the veil to take a driver’s license photograph.”228
While accepting that Freeman’s beliefs were sincere,229 the Florida
appellate court rejected that a substantial burden had been placed on Freeman’s
religious exercise.230 Because there had been testimony that it was
“[c]onsistent with Islamic law [for] women . . . [to be] required to unveil for
medical needs and for certain photo ID cards,”231 and because “the
Department’s existing procedure would accommodate Freeman’s veiling
beliefs by using a female photographer with no other person present,”232 this
meant that “[h]er veiling practice is ‘merely inconvenienc[ed]’ by the
photograph requirement [and that] . . . she failed to demonstrate a substantial
burden.”233 While the Freeman court “recognize[d] the tension created as a
result of choosing between following the dictates of one’s religion and the
mandates of secular law,”234 it reasoned that “as long as the laws are neutral
and generally applicable to the citizenry, they must be obeyed,”235 citing
Braunfeld in support.236
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Freeman v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 48 (Fla. App. 2006).
Id. at 50.
See id. at 51.
Id.
See id. at 52.
Id.
Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 52.
Id.
See id. at 54.
Id. (“[T]here is no substantial burden on Freeman’s exercise of religion.”).
Id. at 56.
Id.
Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Freeman court readily admitted that the “protection afforded to the
free exercise of religiously motivated activity under the FRFRA [Florida
Religious Freedom Restoration Act] is broader than that afforded by the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.”237 However, it rejected that the
substantial burden test under the Florida act had been met238 and thus had no
need to determine whether the state could meet its “heavy dual burden of
demonstrating a compelling interest and that the regulation is the least
restrictive means to meet that interest.”239
If Thomas is any guide,240 then the mere fact that others of the faith may
have different views about what the religion permits and prohibits does not
undermine an individual’s claim that a restriction imposes a substantial burden
on her free exercise rights.241 That said, at least two points might be made.
First, whether federal constitutional guarantees are violated by the Florida
requirement that those receiving a Florida driver’s license be photographed
without a veil is not the focus of this discussion—such a determination might
depend on whether this is a neutral, generally applicable law and on whether
there are very important interests justifying such a law. Second, a separate
question is whether the Florida court’s interpretation of what constitutes a
substantial burden for purposes of the statute was itself too restrictive—it may
be that the Florida Supreme Court’s “narrow definition of substantial burden”
was not meant to be this narrow.242 In any event, the interpretation of the
Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act offered in Freeman is clearly not
as robust as might have been expected under the Sherbert-Thomas line of
cases.243
B.

Christian Romany Church Ministries

At issue in Christian Romany Church Ministries, Inc. v. Broward County
was whether the county would be permitted to condemn and remove a church
through use of its eminent domain power.244 While the county’s doing so

237. Id. at 55 (citing Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1032 (Fla. 2004)).
238. Id. at 54.
239. Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 56.
240. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
241. Lund, supra note 216, at 488 (“The court essentially says that because other Muslim
women in other countries remove the veil for photographs, Freeman should consider herself free
to do so as well. But . . . [i]ndividuals have a right to religious accommodation even on matters
where they differ from their co-religionists.”).
242. See Freeman, 924 So. 2d at 56 (“The narrow definition of substantial burden adopted by
the supreme court tempers the act’s strict scrutiny requirement. A plaintiff must meet a high
standard to show a substantial burden on religious freedom.”).
243. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 707.
244. Christian Romany Church Ministries, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 980 So. 2d 1164, 1165 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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served a public purpose,245 the church nonetheless claimed that its
condemnation would violate Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act246
because the church had nowhere else to go.247
Condemnation and destruction of the church might result in the
congregation’s being unable to hold worship services, which would seem to be
a paradigmatic example of burdening free exercise.248 Yet, the court rejected
that the challenged action would impose such a burden for purposes of the
state’s Religious Freedom Protection Act, because condemnation could not be
construed as either compelling or forbidding religious conduct.249 Because
there was “nothing about this location that is unique or integral to the conduct
of the religion,”250 the court held that “the condemnation does not substantially
burden the exercise of religion.”251
Perhaps the Florida appellate court is correct that condemnation does not
qualify as imposing a substantial burden on religion for purposes of the state
RFRA. Absent some evidence of “bad faith or gross abuse of discretion,”252 it
may be that state law did not prevent the church from being forced to move.
But it can hardly be thought that Florida’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act
provides robust protection if a church can be condemned (for an admittedly
legitimate purpose) even when that condemnation and destruction would make
it impossible for the congregation to worship.253
C. Cordingley
At issue in Idaho v. Cordingley254 was whether Cordingley’s possession of
marijuana and drug paraphernalia was protected under the Idaho Free Exercise

245. Id. (“[T]he church does not dispute that the taking would serve a public purpose.”).
246. Id. (“[The church] asserts that the county has failed to show a reasonable necessity for
the taking and is in violation of the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act (FRFRA).”).
247. Id. at 1166 (“The pastor testified that he did not know where they will go if the church is
taken, and he has no other place for holding religious education.”).
248. See id. at 1168 (“[The] church’s insistence that a specific church building for holding
worship services is fundamental to religious exercise.”).
249. Id. (“Our supreme court expressly rejected any definition of substantial burden other
than that compelling conduct or that forbidding conduct. By no stretch does an otherwise valid
condemnation fall within these limits.”).
250. Christian Romany Church, 980 So. 2d at 1168.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1167.
253. Cf. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir.
2006) (“We find that the County imposed a substantial burden on Appellee Guru Nanak Sikh
Society of Yuba City’s . . . religious exercise under RLUIPA because the stated reasons and
history behind the denial at issue, and a previous denial of Guru Nanak’s application to build a
temple on a parcel of land zoned ‘residential,’ to a significantly great extent lessened the
possibility of Guru Nanak constructing a temple in the future.”).
254. Idaho v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013).
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of Religion Protected Act (FERPA).255 Cordingley had founded the “Church of
Cognitive Therapy (COCT), established specifically for the use of marijuana as
a ‘sacrament,’”256 and he argued that his religious exercise was substantially
burdened by Idaho law.
The Idaho appellate court explained that the “legislative history of the
FERPA makes it clear that in adopting the statute, the Idaho legislature
intended to adopt the ‘compelling interest test’ contained in its federal
counterpart, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which the United
States Supreme Court held in City of Boerne v. Flores . . . was invalid as it
applied to states.”257 The plaintiff had to show that he was engaging in a
religious exercise and that the challenged state law substantially burdened that
exercise.258
At issue was not whether Cordingley’s beliefs were sincere or even
whether the Idaho law substantially burdened the activity associated with those
beliefs.259 Instead, the issue was whether the beliefs at issue were “religious”
for purposes of the Idaho statute when Cordingley had admitted that “the
Church of Cognitive Therapy is not so much a religion as it is a companion to
religion.”260 As such, it provided a way for people to “become spiritual or
enlightened, but it [did] not have a comprehensive belief system with the
trappings of a religion.”261
When analyzing whether the burdened practices qualified as religious, the
court cited to Ballard and Thomas, but also cited Yoder’s attempt to distinguish
between the religious and the merely personal and philosophical.262 The Idaho
court denied that it was trying to be extremely restrictive with respect to what
constituted a religion, instead suggesting that should there be “any doubt about

255. Id. at 731 (“Levon Fred Cordingley appeals from the district court’s intermediate
appellate decision affirming the magistrate’s denial of his motion to dismiss the possession of
marijuana and paraphernalia charges against him on the basis his right to religious freedom under
the Idaho Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act (FERPA).”).
256. Id. at 732.
257. Id. at 733.
258. See id. (“To establish a prima facie RFRA claim, a plaintiff must present evidence
sufficient to allow a trier of fact rationally to find the existence of two elements. First, the
activities the plaintiff claims are burdened by the government action must be an ‘exercise of
religion.’ Second, the government action must ‘substantially burden’ the plaintiff’s exercise of
religion.”) (quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2008)
(internal citations omitted)).
259. Id. at 734 (“[I]t was undisputed that Cordingley’s beliefs were both sincerely held and
substantially burdened by the applicable controlled substances statutes.”).
260. Cordingley, 302 P.3d at 734 (citing the district court opinion).
261. Id. (citing the district court opinion).
262. Id. at 736.
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whether a particular set of beliefs constitutes a religion, the court will err on
the side of freedom and find the beliefs are a religion.”263
To determine whether the beliefs at issue constituted religious beliefs, the
court used a multifactor test. “Under this test, to help determine whether a
particular set of beliefs qualifies as ‘religious’ under the RFRA or its state
equivalent, a court examines the extent to which a party’s asserted ‘religion’
(1) addresses ‘deeper and more imponderable questions’ of the meaning of life,
man’s role in the universe, moral issues of right and wrong, and other ‘ultimate
concerns’; (2) contains an ‘element of comprehensiveness’; and (3) the
‘formal, external, or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted
religions.’”264
The court found that the church met the relevant criteria to some extent.265
However, because some of the factors were not met and because “COCT is
singularly focused on the use of marijuana to a degree that has consistently
been found not to be indicative of statutorily recognized religious practice,”266
the Idaho appellate court found that the practices at issue were not religious
and thus did not qualify for enhanced protection under the Idaho statute.
Yet, it is difficult to reconcile this approach with the approach taken in
Ballard, where the beliefs of the “I Am movement”267 were not examined with
respect to whether they incorporated “ultimate ideas” or constituted a “moral
or ethical belief structure” or even whether the “comprehensiveness of beliefs”
entitled the group to be designated as religious. The Ballard Court noted that
“[r]eligious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others,”268 and that the fact that certain experiences are
“beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect
before the law.”269 Further, a set of beliefs that is described by the adherents as
a “companion to religion”270 would seem to be religious even if not providing
many desired metaphysical answers, precisely because it was to be understood
in light of other beliefs or belief systems.
That said, it was fair for the Cordingley court to point out that the United
States Supreme Court has not always espoused deference to the claim that
particular views are religious.271 The Yoder Court suggested that it is

263. Id. (citing United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1499 (D. Wyo. 1995)).
264. Id. (Adams, J., concurring) (citing Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208–09 (3d Cir.
1979)).
265. Id. at 744 (“to some degree the COCT is comprised of a structure containing some of the
‘accoutrements of religion’”).
266. Cordingley, 302 P.3d at 745.
267. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 79 (1944).
268. Id. at 86.
269. Id. at 87.
270. Cordingley, 154 P.3d at 734.
271. See id. at 736 (discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972)).
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permissible to distinguish between the religious and the philosophical,272
although the Court provided no guidance about how to perform that task
beyond saying that Thoreau’s views were not religious.273 The failure to say
more was regrettable, if only because many of such analyses will be subject to
one of the dangers mentioned by the Ballard Court—permitting the trier-offact to decide whether a particular set of beliefs is religious or, perhaps,
sufficiently profound or comprehensive opens the door to a potentially
unsympathetic trier-of-fact subjecting a set of avowedly religious beliefs to
very critical examination.274 While Yoder might have been trying to protect the
diversity of religious belief,275 it has been used to exclude belief systems from
qualifying as religious.
IV. CONCLUSION
Several states passed their own versions of religious freedom restoration
acts in response to the Smith Court’s narrow construction of free exercise
guarantees.276 While those statutes clearly rejected Smith and attempted to
restore substantial protection of certain religious practices, they did not provide
sufficient clarity with respect either to which beliefs would count as religious
or to what would constitute a substantial burden of religious practice.277
Reinstating strict scrutiny of limitations on free exercise does not as a practical
matter yield great protection if it is very difficult to qualify as a religion or very
difficult to establish that a particular restriction imposes a substantial burden
on religious practice.278
The state courts’ application of their respective state RFRAs has not
resulted in robust protection of free exercise. That may be due in part to the
uneven protection of free exercise in the pre-Smith jurisprudence and in part to
the failure of the respective legislatures to provide more guidance to the
courts.279 Other factors likely playing a role are that courts may fear both that
according robust protection on the basis of a state RFRA will create the

272. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
273. Id.
274. Cf. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87 (“The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ,
life after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one could be
sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed would
be left of religious freedom.”).
275. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220–21.
276. Steven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion under the Constitution, 31
EMORY L.J. 973, 1010–11 (1982).
277. James W. Wright Jr., Making State Religious Freedom Restoration Amendments
Effective, 61 ALA. L.R., 425, 426, 429 (2010).
278. Id. at 430–31.
279. Id. at 435.
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potential for a large number of religious exemption claims,280 and that the
sincerity requirement will not do enough to keep out the “non-meritorious”
claims. Further, whether consciously or unconsciously, triers-of-fact (and
legislators) may be less willing to credit minority religious beliefs and
practices either with respect to whether they really are religious beliefs or with
respect to whether neutral state laws really substantially burden those
beliefs,281 so it should be unsurprising that state RFRAs have not provided
robust free exercise protection of minority religious practices.282
Several cases involving state RFRAs have involved individuals who
sought exemptions from state laws prohibiting the use of controlled
substances.283 It may be that in individual cases those challenging their
convictions were not engaging in sincere religious exercise.284 Nonetheless,
there is no small irony in a court focusing on the sacramental use of drugs as a
reason to deny religious exercise even when some other indicia of religion are
met,285 given that the case sparking the various state RFRAs involved
sacramental use of proscribed drugs.286 So, too, there is no small irony in a
state finding no violation of the state RFRA when condemnation of a church
280. Cf. Evan J. Bergeron, Comment, Organized RFRAFF: A Recommendation to the
Louisiana Legislature on the Best Way to Accomplish a State Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 133, 164 (2010) (“Whether the drafters and supporters of House Bill 340
were simply ignorant of the ramifications of protecting mere expression or whether they made a
conscious and calculated attempt to open the floodgates for religious preferential treatment is
unclear.”).
281. Cf. Frank S. Ravitch, The Unbearable Lightness of Free Exercise under Smith:
Exemptions, Dasein, and the More Nuanced Approach of the Japanese Supreme Court, 44 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 259, 269 (2011) (“The dominant or majority religious community will generally be
protected because its beliefs will be understood, and perhaps empathized with, but for religious
minorities, quite the opposite might be true.”); Molly A. Gerratt, Note, Closing A Loophole:
Headley v. Church of Scientology International as an Argument for Placing Limits on the
Ministerial Exception from Clergy Disputes, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 141, 188 (2011) (“[I]t is less
likely that lawmakers will take counter-majoritarian free exercise claims into consideration when
legislating or that judges will take those claims seriously when judging their sincerity.”).
282. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Establishment Clause Limits on Free Exercise Accommodations,
110 W. VA. L. REV. 343, 357 (2007) (discussing “legislators who may be trusted not to
exaggerate the needs of minority religions over the welfare of the general populace”).
283. State v. White, 271 P.3d 1217, 1219 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011); Rudd v. State, No. 54221,
2010 WL 3503516, at *1 (Nev. July 15, 2010); State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 1004, 1005 (Ariz.
2009).
284. See Rudd, 2010 WL 3503516, at *3 (“At the hearing on the motion, the district court
found that Rudd failed to present evidence and establish that his use of marijuana was religious
and noted that Rudd even denied during his testimony that its use was part of his religious
practice.”).
285. See Idaho v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 745 (Idaho Ct. App 2013) (“[T]he COCT is
singularly focused on the use of marijuana to a degree that has consistently been found not to be
indicative of statutorily recognized religious practice.”).
286. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
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was at issue—Flores, which involved a church seeking a zoning variance,
resulted in the Court invalidating the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act’s application to the states, 287 and also sparked the state RFRAs.
The United States Supreme Court has long been sending mixed messages
about free exercise, sometimes suggesting that religious belief is immune from
second-guessing and sometimes suggesting not only that religious practices
can be prevented or punished but also that the state burden justifying such
limitations is not very great. The Court has also sent mixed signals about
whether or how religious beliefs can be distinguished from other kinds of
beliefs. Because the Court has offered so many mixed signals for decades, it is
unsurprising the state legislatures’ repudiating one decision and praising a few
others has not resulted in robust protection of free exercise at the state level.
Nor are we likely to see a major change in the future whereby minority
religious practices will be afforded more protection. Instead, on both the state
and federal level, we are likely to continue to see uneven and unprincipled
protection of free exercise, which should satisfy no one.

287. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (“A decision by local zoning
authorities to deny a church a building permit was challenged under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. The case calls into question the authority
of Congress to enact RFRA. We conclude the statute exceeds Congress’ power.”).

